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INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE 
 
Amici are law professors who specialize in 
evidence and criminal law and procedure.1 As legal 
academics, amici have an interest in the consistent 
and correct application of the rules of evidence, and 
in reconciling those rules with the constitutional 
right to a fair trial.  
The brief is joined by the following professors:  
Barbara Allen Babcock, Judge John Crown 
Professor of Law, Emerita, Stanford Law School.  
Jeffrey Bellin, Cabell Research Professor of 
Law, William and Mary Law School.  
Darryl K. Brown, O.M. Vicars Professor of 
Law, University of Virginia School of Law. 
Robert P. Burns, William W. Gurley Memorial 
Professor of Law, Northwestern Pritzker School of 
Law. 
																																																								
1 Pursuant to Rule 37.6, amici affirm that no counsel or 
party authored this brief in whole or part. Duke University 
School of Law supports faculty research and scholarship, and 
that financial support contributed to the costs of preparing this 
brief. Otherwise, no person or entity apart from the amici and 
their counsel made any monetary contribution intended to fund 
the preparation or submission of this brief. Duke University is 
not a signatory to the brief, and the views expressed here are 
solely those of the amici. The parties’ letters of consent to the 
filing of this brief have been filed with the Clerk’s Office. 
Counsel of record received timely notice of the intent to file this 
brief. 
	2 
James E. Coleman, Jr., John S. Bradway 
Professor of the Practice of Law, Duke University 
School of Law.  
Lisa Kern Griffin, Professor of Law, Duke 
University School of Law.  
Robert P. Mosteller, J. Dickson Phillips 
Distinguished Professor of Law, UNC School of Law.  
Deborah Tuerkheimer, Professor of Law, 
Northwestern Pritzker School of Law. 
Neil Vidmar, Russell M. Robinson II Professor 
of Law and Professor of Psychology, Duke University 
School of Law.  
 Jessica L. West, Associate Professor of Law, 
Vermont Law School. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The rules prohibiting juror impeachment 
should give way to Sixth Amendment concerns when 
a jury member comes forward with evidence of 
racially or ethnically biased statements made during 
deliberations about a criminal defendant’s guilt. 
First, the fundamental unfairness of a guilty 
verdict tainted by racial prejudice raises particularly 
acute constitutional concerns. An essential 
component of the right to a fair criminal trial is an 
impartial jury, and racial or ethnic bias poses a 
unique threat to that impartiality. See Wright v. 
United States, 559 F. Supp. 1139, 1151 (E.D.N.Y. 
1983) (“If a criminal defendant could show that the 
jury was racially prejudiced, such evidence could not 
be ignored without trampling the Sixth 
Amendment’s guarantee to a fair trial and an 
impartial jury.”). Indeed, racial or ethnic prejudice 
against a defendant abridges the fair trial right 
almost “by definition.” Warger v. Shauers, 135 S. Ct. 
521, 529 n.3 (2014).  
Second, juror testimony is likely to be the only 
available evidence to establish such prejudice. The 
“usual safeguards” this Court has pointed to in prior 
cases about juror bias are not “sufficient to protect 
the integrity of the process” in cases of racial or 
ethnic bias during deliberations. Id. Both the 
substance and the structure of the juror statements 
here distinguish the issues from the considerations 
before the Court in earlier cases concerning 
exceptions to Rule 606(b). Tanner v. United States, 
483 U.S. 107, 127 (1987), addressed juror 
competency rather than juror prejudice. The 
impairment in Tanner (intoxication) was also of a 
type that could be exposed through means other 
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than reliance on juror testimony. Intoxication may 
be observed in the courtroom and is also a potential 
subject of testimony by non-jurors. Similarly, the 
nature of the bias at issue in Warger—bias induced 
by a juror’s “views about negligence liability for car 
crashes” that resulted from a prior accident 
involving her daughter, 135 S. Ct. at 529—differs 
from racial or ethnic prejudice against a defendant. 
It is significantly more likely to be discernable from 
external evidence or revealed during voir dire. 
Third, the administrability concerns that arise 
with general claims of juror dishonesty or partiality 
are not present in the narrower and clearer case of 
expressly racist statements by deliberating jurors. 
The experience of jurisdictions that have admitted 
juror testimony on the limited question of racial or 
ethnic bias suggests that doing so will not 
meaningfully burden the courts or unduly infringe 
on juror privacy. These courts have continued to 
preclude impeachment of jurors unless there is 
objective verification that they made overtly racist 
statements focused on a criminal defendant’s guilt or 
innocence.  
Nor would any new procedural mechanisms be 
required to apply a constitutional exception to Rule 
606(b). Pursuant to the enumerated exceptions to 
the rule, courts already consider juror testimony on 
“extraneous prejudicial information” such as media 
accounts and “outside influences” such as threats 
and bribes. And the factual question they would be 
considering here is an objective one: whether a racist 
comment about the defendant was uttered by a 
deliberating juror. Courts need not even inquire into 
the statement’s effect on internal mental processes 
in order to address the issue of a remedy. The core 
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concerns about protecting deliberations that gave 
rise to Rule 606(b) thus are not implicated.  
Finally, the policy justifications for Rule 
606(b) are not served by applying it in this context. 
Permitting verdicts tainted by racial or ethnic bias to 
remain in place in the interest of “finality” does 
profound harm to the criminal justice system. When 
racial or ethnic prejudice comes to light but 
evidentiary rules bar its consideration, public 
confidence in the “integrity” of adjudication declines. 
Leaving potentially unconstitutional verdicts 
entirely “beyond effective reach” only promotes 
“irregularity and injustice.” Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), 
Advisory Committee Note to subdivision (b).  
When there is direct evidence that a 
deliberating juror expressed clear racial or ethnic 
bias, there is also a serious constitutional question 
about a fair and impartial jury. Courts should be 
permitted to consider juror testimony when faced 
with that question.  
ARGUMENT 
I. THE PARAMOUNT CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONCERN WITH RACIAL OR ETHNIC 
DISCRIMINATION AGAINST CRIMINAL 
DEFENDANTS SHOULD OVERRIDE THE 
EVIDENTIARY BAR TO IMPEACHMENT 
BY JUROR TESTIMONY. 
This case arises at the intersection of the 
Sixth Amendment fair trial guarantee and the 
difficult and lasting problem of racial prejudice 
among jurors. As this Court has previously stated, 
“no right ranks higher than the right of the accused 
to a fair trial,” Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court, 
464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984), and “the inestimable 
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privilege of trial by jury” underlies “the whole 
administration of criminal justice,” Holland v. 
Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 511 (1990) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  
Racial or ethnic bias is an “especially 
pernicious” form of prejudice in the criminal justice 
process to which this Court has long applied special 
scrutiny. Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 555 (1979); 
see also Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 58 (1992) 
(a defendant has “a right to an impartial jury that 
can view him without racial animus, which so long 
has distorted our system of criminal justice”); 
Holland, 493 U.S. at 511 (1990) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting) (noting the Court’s “unceasing efforts to 
eradicate racial prejudice from our criminal justice 
system”). 
The Court has been vigilant, for example, 
about state-sponsored prejudice when prosecutors 
exercise peremptory challenges of jurors for racially 
discriminatory reasons. See Batson v. Kentucky, 476 
U.S. 79, 88 (1986). As the Court recently confirmed, 
“striking even a single prospective juror for a 
discriminatory purpose” violates the Constitution. 
Foster v. Chatman, 2016 WL 2945233 at *2 (U.S. 
May 23, 2016) (quoting Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 
U.S. 472, 478 (2008)). Racial bias in the selection of 
jurors jeopardizes not only the fairness of the 
defendant’s trial but the “very integrity of the 
courts.” Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 238 
(2005). It damages “both the fact and the perception” 
of the jury’s role as a “vital check against wrongful 
exercise of power by the State.” Powers v. Ohio, 499 
U.S. 400, 411 (1991). 
The Court should be no less vigilant when 
allegations arise that express racial or ethnic 
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prejudice has tainted a jury’s deliberations. Cf. 
McCollum, 505 U.S. at 62 (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(cautioning against “exalting the rights of citizens to 
sit on juries over the rights of the criminal 
defendant, even though it is the defendant, not the 
jurors, who faces imprisonment or even death”). 
Indeed, “the constitutional interests of the affected 
party are at their strongest when a jury employs 
racial bias in reaching its verdict.” 27 Charles Alan 
Wright & Victor James Gold, Federal Practice and 
Procedure § 6074, at 513 (2d ed. 2007); see also 
Kittle v. United States, 65 A.3d 1144, 1155 (D.C. 
2013) (noting the “insidiousness of racial or ethnic 
bias”). 
In petitioner’s case—which involves sexual 
assault and harassment charges—a seated juror 
argued during deliberations that “Mexican men take 
whatever they want,” Pet. App. 4a, that “Mexican 
men had a bravado that caused them to believe they 
could do whatever they wanted with women,” id., 
that “Mexican men [are] physically controlling of 
women because they have a sense of entitlement,” 
id., and that the juror’s experience in law 
enforcement suggested that “nine times out of ten 
Mexican men were guilty of being aggressive toward 
women and young girls,” id.  
When prejudiced comments with this sort of 
racist substance taint a verdict, that defect in the 
proceedings requires closer scrutiny than other types 
of juror misconduct or bias. In the Warger case, for 
example, a juror’s personal experience may have 
predisposed her to find for the defendant in a civil 
case involving a car accident. See 135 S. Ct. at 524-
25. The Court found that the juror’s partiality was 
“internal” to deliberations and covered by Rule 
606(b). Id. at 530. But Warger did not involve the 
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sort of bigotry against a criminal defendant that the 
facts of the present case raise. Partiality in the form 
of explicit racial or ethnic prejudice “undermines the 
jury’s ability to perform its function as a buffer 
against governmental oppression and, in fact, 
converts the jury itself into an instrument of 
oppression.” Wright & Gold § 6074, at 513. Racially 
motivated factfinders pose perhaps the greatest risk 
to a fair trial, and they should not find protection 
behind the no-impeachment rule. See, e.g., Strauder 
v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 309 (1879) (finding 
that prejudices against “particular classes” that 
“sway the judgment of jurors” “deny to persons of 
those classes the full enjoyment of that protection 
which others enjoy”). 
Bias, moreover, raises particularly significant 
constitutional issues in criminal cases, which is a 
context that Warger also did not present. See Rose, 
443 U.S. at 563. The guarantee of an impartial jury 
“goes to the very integrity of the legal system.” Gray 
v. Mississippi, 481 U.S. 648, 668 (1987). 
Fundamental fairness depends on factfinders who 
are free from any “predisposition about the 
defendant’s culpability.” Gomez v. United States, 
490 U.S. 858, 873 (1989). Jurors are not “impartial” 
in the “constitutional sense of that term” if they have 
“strong and deep impressions” that “close the mind 
against the testimony that may be offered in 
opposition to them.” United States v. Burr, 25 F. 
Cas. 49, 51 (C.C.D. Va. 1807); see also Parker v. 
Gladden, 385 U.S. 363, 366 (1966) (per curiam) 
(“[P]etitioner was entitled to be tried by 12, not 9 or 
even 10, impartial and unprejudiced jurors”); 
Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308, 313 (1931) 
(stating that a “gross injustice” is perpetrated if a 
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juror “entertain[s] a prejudice which would preclude 
his rendering a fair verdict.”).  
In construing the common law precursor to 
606(b), the Court has held that the no-impeachment 
rule must be sufficiently pliable to accommodate the 
interests of justice. There should be some measure of 
flexibility in the rule, the Court has recognized, 
because cases might arise in which its rigid 
application violates “the plainest principles of 
justice.” McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 269 (1915) 
(quoting United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361, 366 
(1851)); see also Warger, 135 S. Ct. at 529 n.3; Clark 
v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 16 (1933). As the Court 
in Warger also noted, “[t]here may be cases of juror 
bias so extreme” that the no-impeachment rule must 
yield to constitutional concerns. 135 S. Ct. at 529 
n.3. 
For Rule 606(b) to accommodate juror 
testimony on the narrow question of racist comments 
during deliberations would also be consonant with 
the Court’s broader jurisprudence about conflicts 
between fair trial rights and exclusionary rules. 
When evidentiary bars “insulate from discovery the 
violation of constitutional rights,” they may 
“themselves violate those rights.” Wright & Gold 
§ 6074, at 513. Accordingly, the Court has also held 
that the rules of evidence must give way if they 
preclude “the meaningful opportunity to present a 
complete defense.” Holmes v. South Carolina, 547 
U.S. 319, 324, 331 (2006); see also Green v. Georgia, 
442 U.S. 95, 97 (1979) (“In these unique 
circumstances, ‘the hearsay rule may not be applied 
mechanistically to defeat the ends of justice.’”) 
(quoting Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 302 
(1973)); Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308, 320 (1974) 
(“The State’s policy interest in protecting the 
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confidentiality of a juvenile offender’s record cannot 
require yielding of so vital a constitutional right as 
the effective cross-examination for bias of an adverse 
witness.”). 
When the Court balances competing interests 
to determine whether a defendant’s fair trial rights 
should override an evidentiary exclusion, the central 
question is whether “the interests served by a rule 
justify the limitation imposed on a defendant’s 
constitutional right.” Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 
56 (1987). The policy interests behind enforcement of 
Rule 606(b) are simply “at their weakest” in cases of 
jury bias involving racial prejudice. See Wright & 
Gold § 6074, at 513. Because racial or ethnic animus 
by jurors poses a particular danger to fair trial 
rights, the Rule 606(b) bar should not preclude 
consideration of juror testimony about the narrow 
category of statements expressly revealing such 
prejudice during deliberations. 
II. ALTERNATE MECHANISMS FOR 
UNCOVERING TAINTED DELIBERATIONS 
ARE INSUFFICIENT SUBSTITUTES FOR 
JUROR TESTIMONY ABOUT RACIAL OR 
ETHNIC BIAS. 
An exception to the rule against juror 
impeachment is particularly important with respect 
to racial or ethnic bias because it is unlikely 
otherwise to be ferreted out. The Tanner Court 
envisioned safety valves through which alleged 
biases would be revealed and addressed despite the 
Rule 606(b) bar: mechanisms like external 
observation and the voir dire process, as well as non-
juror or pre-verdict evidence of misconduct. 483 U.S. 
at 127. The Colorado Supreme Court in this case, 
and other courts that have followed similar 
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reasoning, relied on these safeguards to conclude 
that the Tanner protections are “also available to 
expose racial biases.” United States v. Benally, 546 
F.3d 1230, 1240 (CA10 2008), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 
1051 (2009).  
Yet visual observation by the judge, counsel, 
or court personnel can do little to bring racial or 
ethnic bias to light. Incompetence and prejudice 
reveal themselves differently. For example, non-
jurors are unlikely witnesses to prejudicial 
statements about a defendant, even though they can 
often testify to misconduct like intoxication. Racial 
animus also lies especially well hidden. The bias at 
issue in Warger—a juror’s sympathy with a 
defendant who had caused a car accident—might 
have been established through objective evidence 
about her personal history, or through statements 
that the juror made outside of the jury room. But 
evidence beyond the jury deliberations is unlikely to 
reveal a juror’s racially discriminatory reaction to 
the evidence at trial. Although there could be 
indications of animus such as membership in certain 
groups, complaints involving other racial 
discrimination, or past behavior towards individuals 
of other races or ethnicities, those external signals 
would not necessarily connect to invidious 
discrimination against a criminal defendant. 
Furthermore, the voir dire process itself will 
rarely uncover racial or ethnic prejudice in jurors. 
Voir dire questioning might expose incentives like 
the Warger juror’s potential identification with the 
defendant because of her daughter’s experience. 
Nothing inhibited the Warger juror from freely 
expressing her views about liability for car accidents 
during voir dire. When it comes to racial or ethnic 
bias, however, a juror can hardly be expected to 
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acknowledge that he harbors some prejudice. A juror 
“may have an interest in concealing his own bias” or 
may even be “unaware of it.” See McDonough Power 
Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 558 (1984) 
(Brennan, J., concurring); see also Neil Vidmar & 
Valerie P. Hans, American Juries: The Verdict 91 
(2007); Maria Krysan, Privacy and the Expression of 
White Racial Attitudes: A Comparison Across Three 
Contexts, 62 Pub. Opinion Q. 506, 507-09 (1998) 
(describing experiments on social pressure to 
conform to norms against prejudice). “Some jurors 
will intentionally deceive the courts, perhaps 
because they are ashamed to admit attitudes that 
are socially unfashionable or even because they 
might welcome the chance to seek retaliation against 
a litigant.” Barbara Allen Babcock, Voir Dire: 
Preserving “Its Wonderful Power”, 27 Stan. L. Rev. 
545, 554 (1975). And “the more prejudiced or bigoted 
the jurors, the less they can be expected to confess 
forthrightly and candidly their state of mind in open 
court.” Id.; see also Jessica L. West, 12 Racist Men: 
Post-Verdict Evidence of Juror Bias, 27 Harv. J. 
Racial & Ethnic Just. 165, 201 (2011) (“Because 
jurors may have difficulty recognizing or admitting 
their biases, the potential for misrepresentations of 
bias may be even greater than it is for other types of 
juror misrepresentations.”). 
During the voir dire process in the present 
case, for example, prospective jurors were repeatedly 
asked routine questions about whether they could be 
“fair” and whether they had feelings “for or against” 
petitioner. Pet. App. 3a. No juror acknowledged any 
racial or ethnic bias. Id. Two of the seated jurors 
have since alleged that in the intimacy of the jury 
room, away from authority figures and public 
scrutiny in the courtroom, a juror made repeated 
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statements to the effect that the jury should convict 
the defendant “because he’s Mexican.” Pet. App. 4a. 
A juror’s overt bias was clearly intertwined with 
consideration of the defendant’s culpability. But the 
sole mechanism for addressing this “grave” instance 
of juror prejudice was consideration of statements 
made during deliberations and brought to light by a 
juror after the verdict. United States v. Villar, 586 
F.3d 76, 87 (CA1 2009).  
Although courts applying Rule 606(b) to 
potential racial or ethnic bias point to the possibility 
that jurors can express concerns about deliberations 
prior to the verdict, that rarely occurs. See Kittle v. 
United States, 65 A.3d at 1155; Commonwealth v. 
Laguer, 571 N.E.2d 371, 376 (Mass. 1991). As in this 
case, jurors typically come forward only after a 
verdict is rendered. The Court’s recent decision in 
Warger has also foreclosed post-trial evidence that a 
juror concealed biases during voir dire. 135 S. Ct. 
521. Cf. West, supra, at 202 (advocating a 606(b) 
exception for cases in which juror statements during 
deliberations reveal a discrete misrepresentation 
about bias during voir dire).  
Accordingly, post-verdict juror testimony is 
likely to be “the only available evidence to establish 
racist juror misconduct.” Racist Juror Misconduct 
During Deliberations, 101 Harv. L. Rev. 1595, 1596 
(1988). And the surface protections that the Court 
referenced in Tanner will not suffice to protect Sixth 
Amendment rights. See West, supra, at 187 
(concluding that the Tanner protections against 
juror bias and misconduct fail when it comes to 
racial bias in the deliberative process). 
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III. A NARROW EXCEPTION FOR 
CONSIDERATION OF JUROR TESTIMONY 
ABOUT DISCRIMINATORY STATEMENTS 
AS TO A DEFENDANT’S GUILT OR 
INNOCENCE IS WORKABLE AND 
CONSONANT WITH EXISTING 
EXCEPTIONS TO 606(b). 
A narrow constitutional exception to consider 
juror testimony on racial or ethnic bias will not 
meaningfully increase the administrative burden on 
the courts or lead to undue harassment of jurors. In 
jurisdictions where it has been permitted, the 
potential ability to impeach jurors on these issues 
has not opened the door to juror testimony beyond a 
small subset of cases involving overt discrimination 
directed at the defendant. It has not required courts 
to evaluate mental processes of jurors in the context 
of deliberations. Nor is there any indication that the 
few claims of this nature have increased post-verdict 
juror harassment. 
In the many courts that allow such 
impeachment, there has been no “barrage of 
postverdict scrutiny of juror conduct.” Tanner, 483 
U.S. at 120-21. In the nineteen federal and state 
jurisdictions that are already hospitable to juror 
impeachment on the question of racial or ethnic bias, 
decades of appellate case law reflect only thirty 
claims by defendants who sought to introduce juror 
testimony concerning racial or ethnic bias in 
deliberations. Experience thus suggests that these 
claims will arise infrequently and that courts can 
ably sort and evaluate them when they do.  
Although a constitutional exception to Rule 
606(b) will require more courts to engage in line-
drawing, statements concerning explicit racial or 
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ethnic bias in the consideration of the defendant’s 
guilt can be readily identified. Even in factual 
situations where prejudice is much harder to 
disentangle from the surrounding facts, such as 
prosecutorial bias in the exercise of peremptory 
challenges, the Court has stated that it cannot be 
“blind” to “the circumstances that bear upon the 
issue of racial animosity.” Foster, 2016 WL 2945233 
at *18. Yet in contrast to nuanced inquiries such as 
Batson challenges, an exception for racist 
statements during deliberations is circumscribed by 
inherent limiting principles. It extends only to 
express racial or ethnic animus pertaining to the 
defendant and addressed to the substance of the 
case.  
The courts that have recognized a 
constitutional override in cases of alleged racial 
prejudice only hear testimony when the statements 
directly relate to the Sixth Amendment concern by 
implicating objective facts about the case. The Sixth 
Amendment issue arises when the juror’s statements 
are linked with consideration of the defendant’s guilt 
or innocence and “received and utilized by the jury in 
an evidentiary context.” Smith v. Brewster, 444 F. 
Supp. 482, 490 (S.D. Iowa 1978). Accordingly, 
comments made by jurors to non-jurors, Wright, 559 
F. Supp. at 1129, statements to non-deliberating 
jurors, United States v. Shalhout, 507 Fed. Appx. 
201, 207 (CA3 2012), and offhand remarks after a 
verdict had already been reached, Shillcutt v. 
Gagnon, 827 F.2d 1155, 1158-59 (CA7 1987), have all 
been held inadmissible. 
The statements in question must also be 
objectively verifiable and subject to corroboration. 
See Perry v. Bailey, 12 Kan. 539, 545 (1874) (“If one 
[juror] affirms misconduct, the remaining eleven can 
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deny.”). The California Evidence Code, for example, 
permits juror testimony about statements made 
during deliberations, but only with regard to 
statements that give rise to a presumption of 
misconduct just because they were uttered. See Cal. 
Evid. Code § 1150(a); In re Stankewitz, 40 Cal. 3d 
391, 398 (1985). The California courts have rejected 
speculative claims or subjective impressions of 
prejudice. In re Stankewitz, 40 Cal. 3d at 398.  
In many other jurisdictions that permit juror 
impeachment to address racial prejudice, courts 
have similarly declined to review statements of bias 
that do not relate to “specific readily identifiable 
facts or actions as opposed to evidence of subjective 
mental attitudes on the part of a juror.” Laguer, 571 
N.E.2d at 376; see also United States v. Brassler, 
651 F.2d 600, 603 (CA8 1981); People v. Holmes, 372 
N.E.2d 656, 659 (Ill. 1978). A constitutional 
exception to Rule 606(b) thus would only render 
testimony about racist statements admissible when 
that testimony can be proven or disproven. The 
objective verifiability of the evidence alleviates any 
concern with juror fraud or the possibility that a 
disgruntled juror could invent misconduct.  
Furthermore, only overtly racist statements 
directed at the evidence—not stray remarks, insults 
exchanged between jurors, or even indications of 
general bigotry unrelated to the defendant—would 
render statements during deliberations admissible. 
See Villar, 586 F.3d at 87; Shalhout, 507 Fed. Appx. 
at 206-07. Despite the permissive approach to juror 
impeachment in the California rules, for example, 
courts there have held that the statements in 
question must constitute more than mere 
suggestions of racist thinking. See People v. Steele, 4 
P.3d 225, 248 (Cal. 2002). Accordingly, courts have 
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rejected testimony concerning general references to 
racial stereotypes during deliberations, as well as 
alleged statements equally applicable to gang 
membership or racial status. See People v. Ali, 2013 
WL 452901, at *19 (Cal. Ct. App. Feb. 7, 2013).  
Nor would broader application of the 
constitutional exception significantly alter jurors’ 
post-trial interactions with counsel and 
investigators. In states that recognize the exception, 
as in states that do not, juror contact rules and 
ethical canons already discourage parties from 
seeking juror statements after trial. The Colorado 
Code of Professional Conduct, for example, prohibits 
post-discharge communications with jurors that 
involve “misrepresentation, coercion, duress or 
harassment.” Colo. R. Prof’l Conduct 3.5(c)(3). In 
many jurisdictions, jurors also receive instructions 
that they need not respond to any post-trial inquiries 
from counsel.  
The present case arose because two jurors 
voluntarily reported their misgivings about the 
deliberations. A strict construction of Rule 606(b) is 
not necessary to protect jurors post-trial but will 
have the effect of frustrating jurors who seek to 
expose the possibility of a tainted verdict. 
Moreover, permitting juror testimony on bias 
expressed during deliberations would not require 
any new procedural protocols. The screening 
mechanisms courts currently employ are the same as 
those used when allegations of external influences 
on jury deliberations arise pursuant to Rule 
606(b)(2). Judges also screen claims that there is 
“good cause” to remove deliberating jurors under 
Rule 23(b). Fed. R. Crim. Pro. 23(b)(2)(B). See, e.g., 
United States v. Thomas, 116 F.3d 606, 620 (CA2 
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1997). Granting review of evidence of racial or ethnic 
bias thus will not upset the existing balance between 
exposing juror misconduct and shoring up the 
finality and legitimacy of verdicts. As with 
allegations of racially-tainted remarks, claims of 
external influence are subject to corroboration and 
refutation. The only initial question is whether the 
information was received or the influence occurred. 
Impact on the verdict is a separate inquiry.  
Faced, for example, with an allegation of 
bribery or receipt of extraneous information, a court 
first allows testimony to determine whether the act 
occurred. See, e.g., Haugh v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 949 F.2d 914, 917 (CA7 1991) (stating that the 
proper procedure is to establish “whether the 
communication was made and what it contained” 
“without asking the jurors anything further and 
emphatically without asking them what role the 
communication played in their thoughts or 
discussion”). The same basic objective analysis 
applies when allegations arise that jurors made 
racially prejudiced statements. Courts need only 
determine “whether the communication was made 
and what it contained.” Id. They make no subjective 
inquiry into the impact of the communication on the 
deliberations. 
Therefore, broader recognition of a 
constitutional exception would encompass only the 
objectively verifiable statements of a juror and would 
not require examination of the internal mental 
processes that Rule 606(b) was drafted to protect. 
See Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), Advisory Committee Note 
(the rule shields “mental operations and emotional 
reactions” during the jury’s deliberative process); see 
also Tobias v. Smith, 468 F. Supp. 1287, 1290 
(W.D.N.Y. 1979) (allowing “objective evidence of 
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matters improperly introduced and considered by 
the jury in its verdict”). Courts need not analyze the 
jury’s actual reasoning process or engage in an ex 
post assessment of whether the jury was affected by 
the racist assertions.  
This is so in determining a remedy for the 
violation as well as its existence. The issue of remedy 
is not before the Court. Nor need the Court decide 
how lower courts should proceed to consider 
testimony about juror statements that reveal 
prejudice during deliberations. The only question 
presented is whether the evidence of bias lies behind 
the 606(b) shield. Indeed, the rule clearly states that 
it “does not purport to specify the substantive 
grounds for setting aside verdicts for irregularity.” 
Fed. R. Evid. 606(b), Advisory Committee Note. 
Notably, however, none of the approaches that 
courts currently employ at the remedial stage would 
require evaluation of the jury’s reasoning process 
during deliberations. 
Under one approach, many lower courts have 
concluded that the Sixth Amendment right is 
violated “if even one member of the jury harbors 
racial prejudice.” United States v. Booker, 480 F.2d 
1310, 1311 (CA7 1973). According to this line of 
cases, proven racial bias on the part of a juror 
constitutes “a structural defect not subject to 
harmless error analysis.” State v. Phillips, 927 A.2d 
931, 934-36 (Conn. App. 2007); see also State v. 
Santiago, 715 A.2d 1, 20 (Conn. 1998) (“Allegations 
of racial bias on the part of a juror are 
fundamentally different from other types of juror 
misconduct because such conduct is, ipso facto, 
prejudicial.”). That conclusion would be consistent 
with this Court’s holding in Gray that jury 
impartiality is “so basic to a fair trial that [its] 
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infraction can never be treated as harmless error.” 
481 U.S. at 668 (quoting Chapman v. California, 386 
U.S. 18, 23 (1967)). 
In other jurisdictions, once the defendant 
establishes by a preponderance of the evidence that 
the jury was exposed to racially biased statements 
that may have infected the judicial process, the 
burden shifts to the state to show that there was no 
prejudice. Whether or not to grant a new trial turns 
on whether there is a “substantial probability that 
the alleged racial slur made a difference in the 
outcome.” Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 1159. Courts 
consider whether comments about the defendant’s 
race or ethnicity would have “affected the verdict of a 
hypothetical average jury.” State v. Hidanovic, 747 
N.W.2d 463, 474 (N.D. 2008). A new trial only occurs 
where the “probable effect” of the racially charged 
comments was to taint the verdict. See, e.g., Villar, 
586 F.3d at 87 (district court determined on remand 
that the verdict was not tainted by the racially 
discriminatory statements and could stand).  
This approach involves the same burden-
shifting framework that operates when there are 
allegations of extraneous prejudicial information 
under Rule 606(b)(2). See United States v. Williams-
Davis, 90 F.3d 490, 497 (CADC 1996) (questioning 
whether there is a reasonable possibility that the 
outside intrusion affected the verdict). Courts are 
already well-equipped to conduct the analysis, and it 
closely resembles the harmless-error review that 
occurs in a variety of contexts. 
Courts confronting statements of racial bias 
may look, for example, to external indications like 
the jury’s decision to acquit on some charges, 
Shalhout, 507 Fed. Appx. at 207, or overwhelming 
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evidence of guilt that reduces concern about racial 
bias infecting a verdict, Fields v. Woodford, 309 F.3d 
1095, 1006-07 (CA9 2002). The admissibility inquiry 
turns only on the objective existence of the racial or 
ethnic prejudice and the nature and timing of the 
statements in question. But the remedial step can 
account for extrinsic indications of the impact on the 
verdict. Appellate courts also generally defer to a 
trial judge’s factual determinations with regard to 
the impact that any racially or ethnically biased 
remarks about the defendant had on the 
deliberations. State v. Levitt, 176 A.2d 465, 468-69 
(N.J. 1961). 
In this case, the facts demonstrate both that 
an individual juror harbored substantial racial bias 
and applied that thinking to the determination of 
the defendant’s guilt or innocence and that the bias 
was so frequently and clearly expressed that it 
tainted the deliberations as a whole. A juror’s 
statements were “directly tied to the determination 
of the defendant’s guilt.” Pet. App. 26a (Marquez, J., 
dissenting). On more than one occasion during 
deliberations, a juror asserted that the defendant 
was guilty “because he’s Mexican.” Pet. App. 4a. The 
trial court in fact acknowledged that the juror 
testimony exposed prejudice in the deliberations, but 
then ruled that the bias could not support a new 
trial because of the no-impeachment rule. Tr. 3 (July 
20, 2010). 
In addition, petitioner’s case was close and 
dependent on a problematic identification. It turned 
in important respects on the credibility of an alibi 
witness whose testimony the juror at the center of 
this appeal also discredited after (erroneously) 
labeling the alibi witness an “illegal.” Pet. App. 4a-
5a; Tr. 14 (Feb. 25, 2010). The jury then indicated 
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initial deadlock on all four charges and ultimately 
declined to convict on the most serious charge. The 
bias expressed here is thus severe, focused on the 
defendant’s ethnicity, clearly connected with 
consideration of the facts of the case, and likely to 
have had an impact on deliberations.  
 In future cases in which a defendant proffers 
juror impeachment involving blatant expressions of 
racism as an argument in favor of guilt, every court 
should have access to the relevant testimony. There 
is no reason to think that jurors would forfeit 
meaningful protections as a result, or that courts 
would be incapable of screening for legitimate 
constitutional claims.  
IV. THE POLICIES THAT RULE 606(b) SERVES 
ARE FURTHERED BY ALLOWING JUROR 
TESTIMONY IN CASES OF ALLEGED 
RACIAL OR ETHNIC BIAS. 
Finally, there are expressive harms to 
applying the no-impeachment rule in cases in which 
the jurors, the court, the defendant, and potentially 
the public all know of overt discrimination for which 
there is no potential remedy. The Colorado Supreme 
Court’s 4-3 decision in this case turned in large part 
on the policy implications of recognizing a 
constitutional exception to Rule 606(b). See Pet. App. 
13a-15a. To be sure, the rule may give effect to 
concerns about intrusion into the jury room and 
public confidence in the finality of verdicts. But the 
scope of juror statements that would be considered 
under a narrow constitutional exception to 606(b) 
leaves the evidentiary exclusion largely intact. The 
category of potential juror testimony is sufficiently 
discrete that there is no danger of the exception 
swallowing the rule. 
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Furthermore, concern with “chilling” jury 
deliberations has no force when express racist 
speech is at issue. The jury necessarily enjoys some 
space for a “fruitful exchange of ideas and 
impressions,” and jurors are “expected to bring 
commonly known facts and their experiences to bear 
in arriving at their verdict.” Shillcutt, 827 F.2d at 
1159. But there is nothing fruitful about racial 
animus. Racial and ethnic prejudice are “unrelated 
to any specific issue that a juror in a criminal case 
may legitimately be called upon to determine.” 
United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1119-20 
(CA9 2001). 
Occasional consideration of juror statements 
under a constitutional exception would not inhibit 
juror exchanges. As it is, jurors neither expect nor 
enjoy complete privacy surrounding their 
deliberations. Rule 606(b) has always permitted non-
juror testimony as well as the use of pre-verdict 
statements. The rule further allows post-verdict 
testimony about external influences even by jurors, 
and it does not address juror revelations outside of 
court. “Juror journalism” and public discussion about 
jury service is not uncommon in high profile cases. 
The Colorado court’s construction of the rule thus 
permits wide reporting in the public domain of 
racially prejudiced statements by jurors while 
precluding any redress in court. 
 Perhaps the strongest arguments favoring 
strict interpretation of Rule 606(b) concern the 
validity of jury decision-making itself, but those also 
lack force when weighed against the harm of racial 
or ethnic bias. Because of the nature of the 
statements at issue, there are important 
institutional interests that counsel in favor of 
permitting inquiry into alleged statements of racial 
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or ethnic prejudice. That inquiry could support not 
only the accuracy of criminal verdicts and the 
unbiased administration of justice, but also the 
integrity and legitimacy of the jury system as a 
whole. 
It is true that jury discussions might, upon 
close scrutiny, fall short of ideals about the 
deliberative process. Jury perfection remains an 
“untenable goal.” Benally, 546 F.3d at 1240. Racial 
prejudice is among the most dangerous of the jury’s 
imperfections, however, and when it reveals itself 
openly, confronting the available evidence will do 
more to preserve the institution of the jury than 
ignoring it. 
A rigid interpretation of Rule 606(b) in the 
face of allegations of racial or ethnic bias affects not 
only the fundamental fairness of the trial but the 
appearance of fairness in the public eye. Indeed, the 
injury of racist fact-finding is not limited to the 
criminal defendant deprived of a fair trial. As this 
Court has recognized, prejudice causes injury “to the 
jury system, to the law as an institution, to the 
community at large, and to the democratic ideal 
reflected in the process of our courts.” Rose, 443 U.S. 
at 556. See also McCollum, 505 U.S. at 49 (“One of 
the goals of our jury system is to impress upon the 
criminal defendant and the community as a whole 
that a verdict of conviction or acquittal is given in 
accordance with the law by persons who are fair.”); 
Batson, 476 U.S. at 87 (stating that the “harm from 
discriminatory jury selection extends beyond that 
inflicted on the defendant and the excluded juror to 
touch the entire community” and “undermine public 
confidence in the fairness of our system of justice”). 
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When a decision is based on bigotry, removing 
the deliberations from the court’s purview damages 
rather than preserves the integrity of the jury. Both 
defendants and the public may become aware of 
racially biased statements by jurors through post-
trial disclosures, and then look to the court to 
determine the constitutional significance of that 
bias.  
If those “‘smoking guns’ are ignored, we have 
little hope of combating the more subtle forms of 
racial discrimination” in the criminal justice system. 
Wilkerson v. Texas, 493 U.S. 924, 928 (1989) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting). Considering testimony 
about openly expressed animus cannot “keep 
improper bias from being a silent factor with a 
particular juror.” Powell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 652 
So.2d 354, 357 (Fla. 1995). It can, however, allow 
courts to address cases in which a juror clearly 
demonstrates prejudice against a defendant or that 
bias is “expressed so as to overtly influence others.” 
Id. at 358.  
This Court has stated that the jury system 
might not survive “efforts to perfect it.” Tanner, 483 
U.S. at 120. But neither can it survive efforts to 
protect it that shield explicit racial prejudice from 
review. 
  
	26 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the 
Colorado Supreme Court should be reversed. 
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